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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DAVID R. TSCHAGGENY and
ELLEN CHARLENE PRICE
TSCHAGGENY, his wife,
Plantiffs and Appellants,
- vs. -

l
I
I
\

UNION PACIFIC LAND RESOURCES CORPORATION and
FRED F. SANDERS,
Defendants and Respondents.

(
1
I
I

No. 14487

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to establish an easement or way of
necessity over certain properties in Weber County, State
of Utah in which there was a unity of title at one time,
the property having been the road bed of the Utah Idaho
Central Railroad. The plaintiffs are the successors in
interest of a certain tract of land, the subject of this
action, which was bounded to the South and to a public
way over property owned by the defendant Union Pacific
Land Resources Corporation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1948, S. J. Quinney, as trustee, conveyed the
property to William M. Howell, and William M. Howell
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in turn conveyed the property to Charles W. Price (Tr.
196 line 24). Price occupied and used the land until
1967 when he sold part of the property back to the
Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation and retained
the balance, the subject of this action, until April of
1975 when it was conveyed to the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs used the property and in order to
reach the same, crossed over the property of the defendant until sometime in 1975, when the defendant Union
Pacific Land Resources Corporation, acting through its
lessee the defendant Fred F. Saunders, placed a gate
across the roadway and placed a lock on said gate, locking them out. Although the period of time in which the
plaintiffs and their predecessors crossed over the defendants' land in order to reach his property was a little
less than the 20 year period to establish a prescriptive
right, it is the plaintiffs' contention that a way of necessity had been established and that the roadway should
be Ordered open and plaintiffs granted the use to cross
defendants' property in order to go in and out of their
own property.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After a hearing the Court took the matter under advisement, and on the 24th day of December 1975, rendered a memorandum decision in substance as follows:
"The Court finds that the plaintiffs and their
predecessors in title have not used the southermost strip of land over which the right-of-way is
claimed for the requisite 20 years under Utah law
in order to establish a prescriptive right.
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"The fact that no prescriptive right exists
makes the question of an easement of necessity a
moot question. This is because an easement of
necessity is simply an easement implied in law to
reserve access to a property retained by a grantor
on the assumption that the grantor would not have
conveyed without reserving a right-of-way. Here
there was nothing in the nature of a right to be
reserved. The essential ingredient to a way of
necessity is that the grantor had access to either
(1) a public way or (2) other property which he
owned or had rights in. Neither exists in this case.
"The plaintiffs' Complaint is, therefore, dismissed, no cause of action.
"Dated and signed this 24 day of December,
1975.
"BY THE COURT
Calvin Gould, Judge"
Later, after arguing a motion for new trial, the Court
reaffirmed its original decision and from this ruling dismissing plaintiffs' Complaint the plaintiffs appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A WAY OF NECESSITY HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED
AND THE ROADWAY SHOULD BE OPENED AND
PLAINTIFFS GRANTED THE USE OF THE RIGHT
OF WAY OVER DEFENDANTS' PROPERTY IN
ORDER T O REACH THEIR GROUND.

All of the testimony would indicate that there was
no other access to the road which had been in continuous use ever since the Utah Idaho Central Railroad sold
the property and removed the tracks therefrom. See Tr.
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182 Lines 12-26; 182 Lines 12-26; 183 Lines 1 to 17
and 184 Lines 7-19.
There was an attempt on part of defendants' counsel
to show a road and access to the plaintiffs' property from
the East. However there was no such road from the piece
known as Stone's and the testimony was that both Stone's
roadway was never used, except as to access to Stone's
field and to the property of the plaintiffs there existed
a swamp and other indications that no road had ever
been established along that line. See Tr. 190 L. 27-30;
191 L. y-16; See also Tr. 181 L. 25-30; 182 L. 1-30 and
183 L. 1-30.
It therefore is apparent from the record that counsel's attempt to show that there was no other means of
egress and ingress to the East of plaintiffs' property rather
than the one, the subject of this action, is entirely without merit.
In the case of Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Utah 22, 197
P.2d 117, Justice Pratt stated:
"The theory upon which a way of necessity
is based is that all the property is once owned by
a single person. He divides it into two tracts and
conveys away one tract. The physical location of
the other tract is such that it is not reasonably
accessible without crossing the tract conveyed
away. If the grantor retains the tract which is
thus surrounded, without any mention of a way,
it is presumed that he intended to reserve a rightof-way to and from the tract retained. If he sells
the tract which is thus surrounded without mention of a means of ingress and egress it is presumed that he intended to create a servient estate

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
in himself to the extent of a right of way in favor
of the other tract of land. The requirements for
a way of necessity are set out in the case of Morris
V. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P.1127, 1132, as
follows :
" '(1) Unity of title followed by severance;
" ' ( 2 ) That at the time of the severance
the servitude was apparently obvious and visible; See (Exhs. P, A, B, C, D, E, and F.)
" '(3) That the easement must be reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate; and
" ' ( 4 ) It must usually be continuous and
self acting, as distinguished from one used
only from time to time when occasion arises.'
(See Exs. A-E) (Tr. 191 L. 2-29)
"'See Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah
52, 185 P.2d 264; citing Morris V. Blunt, and
reaffirming requirement number three above,
and discussing generally the doctrine of easements by implication, and reasonable necessity;
Smith v. Sanders, 112 Utah 517, 189 P.2d 701,
Fayter v. North, 30 Utah 156, 18 P. 742, 6
L.R.A., N.S. 410.
"It is apparent then, from an analysis of the
above requirements that the doctrine has its basis
in the theory of a grant by reason of circumstances
attendant at the time of the grant. It is inconsistent with the adversity contemplated in the
theory of an easement based upon prescription.
"A way of necessity arises from the existence
of such necessity at the time of the dividing of
the property. A right of way by prescription can
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only be obtained by satisfying certain other requirements. These requirements may, for all practical purposes, be included within the three set
out below though the cases under particular fact
situations have emphasized other subdivisions. The
three uses are: (1) Continuous; (2) Open; and
(3) Adverse under a claim of right. See Jensen v.
Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P.2d 1070; Dahl v.
Roach, 76 Utah 74, 287 P. 633; Bowers v. Gilbert,
63 Utah 245, 224 P. 881; Morris v. Blunt, supra;
Colton v. Murphy, 41 Utah 591, 127 P. 335; Lund
v. Wilcox, 34 Utah 205, 97 P. 33. For a recent
discussion of the elements necessary to attain a
prescriptive right, and the confusion that has
existed on this matter in the past, see Zollinger v.
Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 P.2d 714, 170 A.L.R.
770."
In the case of Hancock v. Henderson, 236 Md. 98,
202 A.2d 499, 9 ALR 3rd, 592, the Court stated:
"We have said the doctrine of easements by
necessity is based upon a public policy favoring
full utilization of land and a presumption the
parties do not intend the land conveyed be rendered unfit for occupancy. Condry v. Laurie, 184
Md 317, 321, 41 A.2d 66. In 3 Tiffany Real Propetry, (3d ed.). Section 793, pages 296, the writer
states that decisions are not in harmony where
the property borders on navigable water. The cases
seem to be searching for the intent of the parties,
but some hold that where none is expressed it will
be presumed the parties intended any lawful use
of the property.
"As in Condry v. Laurie, supra, we are dealing
with the rights and obligations of subsequent title
holders of both the alleged dominant and servient
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properties. The Hendersons, as remote grantees,
cannot create the way of necessity. If the way of
necessity was not implied at the time of the grant
in 1898 it cannot be established by a subsequent
necessity. Feldstein v. Segall, 198 Md 285, 294,
81 A2d 610; 28 CJS Easements #35 b. In other
words, the necessity must be determined from the
conditions as they existed at the time of the conveyance. In the first Condry v. Laurie case we
held that a personal license in the deed did not
negate a way of necessity, but the occasion for
using the way was deferred until expiration of the
license, the necessity having been in existence at
the time of the grant. The theory is that such an
easement, being appurtenant, passes with each
conveyance to subsequent grantees. Douglass v.
Riggin, 123 Md 18, 23, 90 A. 1000. Hence a remote grantee of land not being used at the time
of severance may nevertheless, when the use becomes necessary to the enjoyment of his property,
claim the easement under his remote deed. See
Finn v. William, 376, 111 95, 33 NE2d 226, 133
ALR 1390, which is the subject of an annotation
in 133 ALR 1393 on the effect of non-use of a
way of necessity. This rule is consonant with the
generally held view that non-use alone is not sufficient to extni^uish a way by necessity. Knotts v.
Summit Park Co., 146 Md 234, 126 A 280. * * *
"We now turn briefly to the question of location of the right of way. While the way by necessity did exist at the time Little Woods was conveyed away, there was no proof in the case that its
location was established at that time. There was
testimony of course that a road existed in 1911
for a brief span of time utilized for a limited
purpose, and as noted previously soon thereafter
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it fell into disuse until the appellees recently began
to improve it. We do not think this slight activity
so long ago was sufficient to establish with exactitude the location of an easement claimed now by
a remote grantee of the dominant tract. It appears
that the roadbed claimed is not inconveniently
located on the servient land which is now being
farmed. While there is some dispute, counsel for
the appellants claimed it nearly bisects the farm.
The uses now being made of both parcels of land
have materially changed since 1911. While there
is no question that the appellees have a way by
necessity over the land of the appellants, we are
of the opinion that the equitable disposition of
the case calls for us to remand it to the lower
court for a determination of a location of the road
which will be fair to both sides. * * *"
POINT II.
UNITY OF TITLE FOLLOWED BY SEVERANCE.

In the present case, there was no doubt there had
been a unity of title. The Court certainly can take judicial notice of the fact that the Utah Idaho Central Railroad had owned the entire tract where it laid its tracks
and that the entire tract constituted the roadbed of this
railroad. Subsequently the property was sold off in sections with the plaintiffs being the ultimate owners, and
from the exhibits as herein set forth, the only access to
the property was over the land of the defendant and while
the use has not existed for the past 20 years, it certainly
was the intention of the parties to reserve to the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest the right-of-way
over the property as a means of ingress and egress.
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In the case of Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Utah 22, 197
P.2d 117, Justice Pratt stated:
"The theory upon which a way of necessity
is based is that all the property is once owned
by a single person. He divides it into two tracts
and conveys away one tract. The physical location
of the other tract is such that it is not reasonably
accessible without crossing the tract conveyed
away. If the grantor retains the tract which is
thus surrounded, without any mention of a way,
it is presumed that he intended to reserve a right
of way to and from the tract retained. If he sells
the tract which is thus surrounded without mention of a means of ingress and egress it is presumed that he intended to create a servient estate
in himself to the extent of a right of way in
favor of the other tract of land. The requirements
for a way of necessity are set out in the case of
Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127, 1132,
as follows:
" '(1) Unity of title followed by severance;
" ' ( 2 ) That at the time of the severance
the servitude was apparently obvious and visible; (See Exs. P, A, B, C, D, E and F)
" c (3) That the easement must be reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate; and
" ' ( 4 ) It must usually be continuous and
self-acting, as distinguished from one used
only from time to time when occasion arises.' "
(See Exhs. A to E) (Tr. 181 L. 2 to 29)
In 19 C.J. ff 155-156, it was recited:
"An owner of land cannot have an easement
in his own estate in fee, for the plain and obvious
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reason that he has an unlimited right to use the
land in any manner he chooses, and all subordinate and inferior derivative rights are necessarily
merged and lost in the higher right. * * * and the
right of way is extinguished * * * *.
"However an exception to the general rule
arises in the case of a way of necessity. Where
there is a unity of ownership a previous right of
way which came into existence by necessity is
merely in suspension and not extinguished.55
Again in 19 C.J. 947, Sec. 161, it recites:
"Ordinarily after a merger by the unity of title
to the dominant and servient estates the owner
grants the former dominant estate to another, it
passes without the former incidents unless they are
revived by force of the grant itself, by such words
of description as could bring them into being by
way of a new grant; and conversely if he conveys
the servient tenement there is no revival of the
easement unless there is an express reservation in
his favor. But although the old easement is not
revived by the severance, yet a new easement may
be granted by implication, if it is apparent, continuous, and necessary, upon the same principle
and under the same circumstances that easements
are granted by implication upon the severance of
an estate originally entire.55
POINT III.
THERE WAS AN IMPLIED EASEMENT OF NECESSITY WHICH AROSE BY IMPLICATION.

In Hellberg v. Coffin Sheep Co., 404 P.2d 770, 66
Wash.2d 664 (1965), the Court stated:
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"Implied easements appurtenant to land and
easements of necessity arise by implication."
"An 'easement of necessity' is an expression
of public policy that will not permit property to
be landlocked and rendered useless, and in furtherance of that policy the owner, or one entitled to
beneficial use of landlocked property has right
to condemn private way of necessity for ingress
and egress. RCWA 8.24-010.-Id."
Again in 25 Am. Jur.2d 447, Sec. 34 Way of Necessity
are generally described :
"A way of necessity is an easement founded
on an implied reservation. It arises where there
is a conveyance of a part of a tract of land of
such nature and extent that either the part conveyed or the part retained is shut off from access
to a road to the outer world by the land from
which it is severad or by this land and the land of
strangers. In such a situation there is an implied
grant of a way across the grantor's remaining land
across the portion of the land conveyed. The order
in which two parcels of land are conveyed makes
no difference in determining whether there is a
right of way by necessity appurtenant to either.
"A way of necessity results from the application of the presumption that whenever a party
conveys property he conveys whatever is necessary for the beneficial use of the land he still possesses. Such a way is of common-law origin, and
is presumed to have been intended by the parties.
A way of necessity is also said to be supported by
the rule of public policy that lands should not be
rendered unfit for occupancy or successful cultivation. Whether a grant or reservation of a way
of necessity should be implied, however, depends
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on the terms of the conveyance and the facts of
the particular use. The implication will not be
made where it is shown that the parties did not
intend it. Nor will an implied easement of necessity be judicially recognized where it is precluded
by statute.
"Questions in respect of the permanency, apparency, and continuity of servitude, which are
of importance in connection with easements implied on severance of property from the fact that
a use had been imposed on one part of the propertly for the benefit of another part, are not
applicable to typical ways of necessity. There is a
definite distinction between such an easement and
a way of necessity, mainly because a way of necessity does not rest on a pre-existing use but on the
need for a way across the granted or reserved
premises."
See Restatement of the Law, Sec. 476, which states
on page 2978:
"An easement created by implication arises as
an inference of the intention of the parties to a
conveyance of land. The inference is drawn from
the circumstances under which the conveyance
was made rather than from the language of the
conveyance. To draw an inference of intention
from such circumstances, they must be or must
be assumed to be within the knowledge of the
parties. The inference drawn represents an attempt to ascribe an intention to parties who had
not thought or had not bothered to put the intenion into words, or perhaps more often, to parties
who actually had formed no intention conscious
to themselves. In the latter aspect the implication
approaches in fact, if not in theory, crediting
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the parties with intention which they did not have,
but which they probably would have had had
they actually foreseen what they might have foreseen from information available at the time of
the conveyance * * *."
In Choumos v. Alkema, 27 Utah 2d 244, 494 P.2d
950, Chief Justice Callister said at pages 274-8 as follows:
"The evidence indicates that defendants and
their predecessor in interest, Shelby, have had
ownership and possession of this tract since 1943.
Such circumstances negative the superior right
to possession which plaintiff must prove to prevail in the instant action.
"The trial court further determined that defendants had an easement across plaintiff's property in Section 29 to their tract located therein.
The trial court found two alternative grounds
upon which to support its determination, first, an
easement by implication, second, a prescriptive
easement.
"The trial court found that in 1943 when
Shelby acquired the tract from Fraziers, there was
no other access to the strip; the road across Fraziers5 property was apparent, obvious, and visible;
Shelby used the road for access to the strip where
he held and watered his cattle. The trial court
further found that upon severance of the strip
by Fraziers5 conveyance to Shelby in 1943 with
Fraziers5 retaining the balance of their holdings
in the southwest quarter of Section 29, there was
created an easement by implication with respect
to the use of the road in favor of the tract severed.
Such easement was appurtenant thereto, and defendants acquired their rights to the easement at
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the time Shelby conveyed the parcel by warranty
deed to them.
"The findings of the trial court comport with
the requirements set forth to establish an easement by implication, namely, (1) unity of title
followed by severance; (2) at the time of severance the servitude was apparent, obvious and visible; (3) the easement was reasonably necessary
to the enjoyment of the dominant estate; and (4)
the use of the easement must be continuous as
distinguished from one use from time to time when
the occasion arises."
It is also to be noted that the Warranty Deeds to
the two pieces of land made by Mr. Price recited subject
to existing easements and rights of way "of record."
According to the testimony of defendant's own witness
these documents were prepared by the legal department
of the Union Pacific Railroad, and without any professional help to Mr. and Mrs. Price. (Tr. 237, Lines 23-30)
On February 24, 1948, a Receivers Deed was made
from S. Q. Quinney, Receiver for the Utah-Idaho Central Railroad to William Howell to part of the roadbed
of the Utah Idaho Central Railroad. Part of this property
was in turn conveyed by William Howell and his wife
to Charles W. Price and Ellen B. Price. Plaintiffs certainly
intended a right of way and were mislead by defendants adding "of record."
On May 13, 1967, Price and his wife conveyed part
of this land to the Union Pacific Railroad, "subject to
existing easements and rights of way of record."
It is true that on that same date the exhibits will
show a conveyance was made by quit claim deed of a
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tract including several fragments and segments in this
same area. No reservation of the easements and rights
of way was made in this separate quit claim deed, but
as the Court recited from the bench, that inasmuch as
both instruments were dated the same date the Court
should consider them as one instrument.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff, therefore, respectfully submits that all of
the necessary elements exist in the instant case and that
it was the intention of the parties to create a way of
necessity.
There was a unity of title as testified to by the Defendants' own witness. The entire tract, including the
piece owned by the plaintiff and the tract now owned
by the defendant constituted the roadbed of the old
Utah-Idaho Central Railroad; that when it was divided,
title was conveyed to William Howell, who in turn conveyed to Charles W. Price and his wife, Ellen B. Price,
who in turn conveyed to the plaintiff.
In Wagner v. Fairlamb, 379 P.2d 165, 151 Colo 481
(1963), the Court said:
"The three requirements to be met, generally
before way of necessity exists are original ownership of entire tract by single grantor prior to
division, necessity existing at the time of severance, and great necessity for the particular rightof-way.
"That there was property which was involved
in location of right-of-way of necessity in favor of
southern tract over northern tract and which be-
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longed to third person, whose rights had not been
determined did not preclude existence of easement, -id."
It is to be noted in all of these conveyances, including
the Warranty Deeds, of which the defendant has made
so much claim, recited "subject to existing easements
and rights of way of record.55 The Court can certainly
disregard defendant's attempt to establish any other
means of egress and ingress to the property, inasmuch as
the attempts, including the pictures, certainly failed as
to proof and at the present state of recording, plaintiff's
property is landlocked and therefore becomes useless.
This, we submit is contrary to public policy and most
certainly was not the intention of the parties at the time
of the making of the conveyance.
Respectfully submitted,
LA MAR DUNCAN
Attorney for plaintiffs
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